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NEW YORK MINIMUM WAGE ACT
FOR MIGRANT WORKERS
I. Introduction
The abject state in which most migrant workers in this country
exist has recently become a matter of national concern. The
increasing stridency of the migrants, personified by Csar Chavez
in California, has resulted in recognition of the need for legislative
assistance to rescue them from their plight. The migrant worker is
unable to help himself, being burdened by a low annual income
and an education level of only eight and a half years in school.1
In New York, the migrant's situation is aggravated by the
powerful position of the crew leader or "farm labor contractor,"
who often determines workers' wages. As middleman between
the farmer and the workers, the crew leader recruits the number
of workers needed by the farmer, transports them to New York,
and negotiates the migrants' wages with the farmer.2 Since the
crew leader is usually paid only for the number of workers he
delivers, he has no incentive to bargain for higher employee
wages.3 Additionally, the crew leader exercises great control over
job assignment, pay disbursement, and housing and trans-
portation, serving as "foreman, paymaster, Dutch uncle, money
lender, grocer, policeman, judge and jury."'4 In this position, the
crew leader is able to abuse his authority for his own benefit at
the expense of the migrants.
5
'91 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 12 (1968). In 1966, the national average income for migrant
workers was $1,580.
2 Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 1. Most crew leaders are former migrant workers
who gain sufficient stature to be recognized by the farmers. They are paid by a farmer
to recruit, transport, and supervise the migrant workers needed to harvest crops. In
good years, a crew leader may earn as much as $50,000. See Friedland, Labor Waste
in New York-Rural Exploitation and Migrant Workers, TRANS-ACTION 52 (Feb.
1969); Hoffman & Seltzer, Migrant Farm Labor in Upstate New York, 4 COLUM. J.L
& Soc. PROB. I (March Supp., 1968); and MOORE, THE SLAVES WE RENT (1965) at
25-34.
3 Hoffman, supra note 2, at S-1. Those workers who come to New York without a crew
leader are not guaranteed any set wage by the farmer and may be paid less than
promised.
4 Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1969 at 1, col. I.
5 The potential for personal gain is felt by many crew leaders to be a fringe benefit.
Friedland, supra note 2, at 52.
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As a means of improving the condition of migrant workers in
New York, the New York Legislature recently extended min-
imum hourly wage coverage to farm employees. 6 The effects of
this attempt to deal with the migrant problem will be closely
observed by other states.
II. Principal Provisions of the Act
A. The Minimum Wage Provision
The minimum wage act's main clause provides that farm em-
ployers shall pay employees $1.40 per hour beginning October 1,
1969. On February 1, 1971, the minimum wage will increase to
$1.50 per hour. The current New York minimum wage for
non-farm workers is $1.60 per hour. 7 This $1.60 wage rate was
not extended to farm employees partially because of a concern
that New York growers would lose their competitive position
relative to out-of-state farmers if the New York growers were
required to pay a higher minimum wage. 8 Because migrants
frequently work long hours during peak periods, overtime is an
important factor. However, New York's new law does not extend
the usual time-and-a-half rate for work in excess of forty hours a
week to farm workers. Rather it merely provides that the min-
imum wage must be paid for every hour worked. 9
A statutory minimum wage is a definite improvement over New
York's present wage payment practice. Although New York farm
employees averaged $1.54 per hour in 1968, the new minimum
wage should significantly affect those wage rates at the low end of
the wage scale.10 In 1967, those New York migrants working
6 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 670-683 (McKinney Supp. 1969). N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1330
(McKinney Supp. 1969). New York has also attempted to help the migrant worker by
enacting an amendment to the Public Health law setting up minimum standards for
housing in migrant labor camps. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAWS § 1331 (McKinney
Supp. 1969).
7 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 652 (I) (c) (McKinney 1966).
8 N.Y. Times, February 4, 1969, at 26, col. 4. Since much of the New York hearings on
the migrant wage bill were closed to the public, the rationale for many of the
provisions of the act and for other regulations promulgated thereunder are not a
matter of public record.
9 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1969). Compare New Jersey's minimum wage
provision for migrant workers, which not only does not provide for overtime, but,
moreover, removes the minimum wage floor after 40 hours. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:11-56(a) (4) (1966).10
N.Y. Times, April 17, 1969, at 48 col. 1.
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more than twenty-five days a year on farms averaged $2,800, an
annual wage either negotiated between the crew leader and the
farmer, or offered to the workers by the farmer without guarantee
of payment."' The minimum hourly wage requirement will alle-
viate this present situation in which migrants are completely at
the mercy of the labor market.
One of the most important provisions of the minimum wage
program is that farmers must begin to pay workers for those
hours spent in travelling to the farmer's fields each day, in waiting
for field operations to begin, and in similar work delays, although
the farmer need not pay for time lost due to poor weather condi-
tions.12 Currently the worker bears the entire cost of time loss,
although time losses may run as high as twenty-five percent of
total hours worked.' 3 Workers may be idle three to four weeks
during the harvest season because of rain, bad field management
practices, or crop backlogs at processing plants. Under the new
act, the cost of time losses will be allocated to the employees and
to the farmer.
The State Labor Commissioner' 4 has responsibility for promul-
gating all regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the
new law,' 5 and thus the precise ratio of loss allocation will depend
upon his construction of the law's "hours worked" provision.'
6
For example, whether time losses due to unripened crops will be
considered a loss due to "weather" (and thus borne by the work-
er), or "time spent on a single farm" (and thus borne by the
employer) is a determination that the Commissioner will have to
make. It seems more equitable to require the farmer to bear this
particular cost, since he estimates the date by which crops will
ripen and accordingly requires the workers to be at his farm by
that date. Despite the statutory uncertainty created by vesting
decisional discretion in the Labor Commissioner, the act does
a1 Hoffman, supra note 2, at S-3. This New York average annual wage should be dis-
tinguished from the U.S. average annual wage for migrant workers of $1,580 in 1966
See note I supra. The New York average is calculated for heads of households only,
while the national average is based on the earnings of all migrant workers, including
relatively low earning juveniles.
1
2
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 671 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
13 Friedland, supra note 2, at 52.
14 The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor to administer, through the Labor
Department, the labor laws of the state. N.Y. LABOR LAW, §§ 10, 21 (McKinney
1965).
Is N.Y. LABOR LAW § 674 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
16 Note 12, supra.
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spread the risk of financial loss more fairly by requiring the
farmer and the worker to share the risk of wasted hours. 17
One possible difficulty with the minimum wage law centers
around the provision allowing payment at lower than the min-
imum if an employer pays his workers piece-rate rather than on
an hourly basis.18 The new Regulations set out by the Labor
Commissioner provide that if eighty percent of a farmer's employ-
ees earn piece-rate wages equal to, or more than, the minimum of
$1.40 an hour, the other twenty percent of the workers may be
paid less than $1.40 an hour, provided that the total group aver-
age is not less than the required minimum wage. 19 Children under
seventeen years of age working as hand harvesters on the same
farm as their parents are excluded from this group average, and
can be paid as much as twenty-five cents less than the minimum
wage if the farmer obtains a "youth rate certificate" on the
child. 20 The piece rate exception to the minimum wage require-
ment seems to undermine the act's announced goal of raising the
wages of those workers at the bottom of the wage scale. 21 In
effect, the piece rate exception could force one out of five work-
ers to live on a wage rate deemed by the legislature to be less than
sufficient for adequate maintenance and health.
Another possible problem with the minimum wage law is the
provision authorizing the Labor Commissioner to permit a farmer
to deduct certain allowances from his employees' daily wages.
22
Under the Regulations, allowable deductions include the cost to
the farmer of meals and lodging provided to the worker. 23 Pre-
viously, the crew leader or labor camp operator provided food
17 Friedland, supra note 2, at 54; Hoffman, supra note 2, at S-4. Friedland claims that if
farmers bear the cost of lost time, they will demand that state farm agencies devise
more productive management methods. Hoffman states that farmers will react to the
new cost for time lost by having workers do construction work, pruning, painting,
etc., during bad weather, rather than leaving them idle.
IsN.Y. LABOR LAW § 674 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
19 N.Y.C.R.R..§ 190-3.1 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
201d. §§ 190-3.2, 4.2(c). Such a certificate may be obtained by application to the Labor
Commissioner. The regulations as thus far promulgated do not prescribe the condi-
tions for issuing the certificate.
21 Note 10, supra.
22 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 674 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
23 N.Y.C.R.R. § 190-2.2 (McKinney Supp. 1969) allows a farmer to deduct up to 55c per
meal and 65c per room per day. If an apartment or house is provided, up to $1.30 per
day may be deducted for each occupant, with a maximum deduction of $2.60.
[Vol. 3:1
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and housing to workers, and the farmer took no responsibility for
either of these necessities. 2 4 The provision for wage deductions
may enable the farmers to save money by excessive pricing of the
meals and lodging furnished the migrants. Whether the workers
receive full value for the deductions taken will depend on ade-
quate enforcement of the Regulations by the Commissioner.
When a farmer has failed to comply with the minimum wage
provisions, an aggrieved worker has two avenues of relief. He
may sue the farmer directly, or he may request the Labor Com-
missioner to bring an action on his behalf.25 In view of the limited
means of the average migrant, it is unlikely that he would com-
mence a civil suit. Moreover, the Regulations do not prescribe the
procedure by which the assistance of the Commissioner may be
invoked. Unless the Commissioner acts to make relief readily
accessible to the migrant, the migrant may be discouraged from
claiming his rights.
B. Appellate Review and Advisory Council Provisions
Both employer and workers have the right to obtain review of
any regulation or compliance order issued by the Labor Commis-
sioner by petitioning the Board of Standards and Appeals2 6 to set
aside or modify the regulation or order.2 7 The Board's appellate
jurisdiction is exclusive and its decision binding.28 However, a
party adversely affected by its ruling may appeal directly to the
appellate division of the New York Supreme Court.
2 9
One feature of the appeal procedure is that an employer, when
appealing a regulation or compliance order, may not avoid making
the minimum wage payments to his employees unless and until he
provides security in the form of a bond filed with the Board, or an
escrow account on behalf of the workers. This security must
equal the difference between the wage employees presently re-
2 4 Aricultural Labor Relations- The Other Farm Problem. 14 STAN. L. REV. 120 (1961).
25 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 681 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
26 The Board of Standards and Appeals of the Labor Department is a three member body
appointed by the Governor. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 12 (McKinney Supp. 1969). It has
the power to promulgate and amend rules for carrying out the labor laws. N.Y.
LABOR LAW § 27-29, 110 (McKinney 1965).
27 N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 676, 677 (McKinney Supp. 1969).




ceive from the employer, and what they are entitled to receive
under the minimum wage regulation.30 The bank holding the es-
crow account may not release the fund without written author-
ization from the Board.a1 However, this security requirement can
be waived if the Board considers the employer to be "of such
financial responsibility" that back wage payments to workers can
be assured without the need of security.3 2 Whether this waiver
provision becomes a means by which some farmers can avoid
prompt payment of wages due workers will depend on the
Board's careful exercise of its discretionary power to waive the
requirement.
A unique aspect of the new law is the provision establishing an
advisory council to represent the farmers, the employees, and the
general public.3 3 The Council will consist of eleven members: five
representing the employer, five representing the workers and the
public, and one impartial chairman. Appointed by the Labor
Commissioner for five year terms, the members will advise the
Commissioner on all matters related to minimum wages for work-
ers, and may recommend any measures they consider necessary.
The Council is empowered to subpoena witnesses, hold hearings,
require production of records, and call upon any state agency for
assistance.3 4 The Commissioner may not issue any Regulation
until he has consulted with the Council and duly considered their
proposals.aa However, the Council is clearly only an advisory
body, and lacks the authority to compel the Commissioner to
follow its suggestions. Thus there is some risk that the Council
could develop into an ineffectual committee whose views are
heard, but ignored.
The Council could be effective in reconciling the often diver-
gent interests of New York farmers and farm workers. However,
finding individuals sufficiently representative of farm workers, yet
sufficiently articulate to be effective members of the Council, may
be a difficult problem. Migrants are relatively uneducated and
30 Id. § 676(3).
31 Id. § 676(3)(b).
32 Id. § 676(7). Neither the Act nor the Regulations provide any criteria for determining
whether an employer is "of such financial responsibility."
33 Id. § 675(5,6).
34 id. § 675(5).
35 Id. § 674(3).
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disorganized, unlike the farmers who are well organized in lobby
and pressure groups on both state and federal levels of govern-
ment.3 6 A New York equivalent of Csar Chavez has not ap-
peared on the scene to express to the general public the plight of
his fellow workers.
C. Administrative and Penal Provisions
The new law gives the Labor Commissioner authority to in-
vestigate alleged abuses of wage payment provisions and to penal-
ize employers for violations.3 7 The Commissioner is empowered
to enter upon any farm to examine a farmer's wage records, to
determine if the farmer is complying with the regulations, and to
require full statements by the farmer of the contents of his
records at any time the Commissioner considers necessary.38
If an employer fails to comply with the minimum wage provi-
sions, he may be found guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment of not more than
90 days, or both.39 Discrimination against a worker who raises his
rights under the law also carries a $500 fine.40 As imprisonment is
not likely to be resorted to, the provision of a fine of only $500
may prove to be an inadequate deterrent.
The act also gives the Commissioner the opportunity to protect
migrant workers from abuse by the crew leader by providing that
an agent of an employer is subject to liability for the above
violations.41 That the crew leader is an agent of the farmer seems
clear inasmuch as the farmer usually only deals with migrant
workers through the crew leader.
42
III. Conclusion
The goal of the minimum wage law is to eliminate farm workers'
employment at "wages insufficient to provide adequate mainte-
nance and protection of health." 43 The New York Act is the most
36 Kovarsky, Congress and Migrant Labor, 9 ST. Louis U.L. J. 293, 323 (1965).
37 Id. § 678.
38 Id.
9 Id. § 680.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See text at note 2, supra.
43 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 670 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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comprehensive of the existing migrant minimum wage provisions
in effect and should do the most to aid the migrant worker. 44 But
inasmuch as the New York provision vests broad discretionary
powers of enforcement and implementation in the Labor Commis-
sioner, its efficacy will depend to a great extent upon his desire to
improve, rather than to perpetuate, the present position of the
migrant worker. The provision of minimum wage protection for
migrant workers is a step in the right direction, but it remains to
be seen just how far that step will carry the migrants in their drive
for economic security.
- Karen E. Kuntz
44 California and Colorado include farm workers in their minimum wage legislation, but
this legislation is applicable only to women and children. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1178
(West 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-7-6 (1963). Michigan's minimum wage
provisions are not applicable to "agricultural fruit growers, pickle growers, and
tomato growers or other agricultural employers who traditionally contract for the
harvesting on a piecework basis, as to those employees ... used for such harvesting."
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 408.394 (1967). These employees are paid on the basis of a
scale established by the Wage Deviation Board of the Labor Department that pro-
vides an equivalent to the minimum wage for "a worker of average ability and
diligence," a vague quality. [Such a scale has been established-see R. 408.711, and
R. 408.712 (1967), and R. 408.713 (1968).] New Jersey has a minimum wage act for
all employees, including farm employees, but removes the wage floor protection for
farm workers after forty hours of work a week. Note 9, supra.
